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SUMMARY 
New developments in maritime industry include the design and operation of autonomous ships. The AUTOSHIP project 
is one initiative promoting the use of autonomous ships in European waters focusing on two specific use cases, a Short 
Sea Shipping (SSS) cargo vessel and an Inland Waterways (IWW) barge. The AUTOSHIP objectives include thorough 
regulatory, societal, financial, safety and security analyses for the two investigated use cases as well as the development 
of a novel framework and methods for the design of autonomous vessels. This objective is achieved with the support of a 
number of activities, including supply chain, regulatory, risk and gaps analyses. Some results and findings from these 
activities are presented in this paper. The results demonstrate that the supply chain analysis is important to understand the 
complex relationships between different partners and phases for the effective design of maritime autonomous systems. 
Furthermore, a number of regulatory gaps needs to be addressed for the wider adoption of the AUTOSHIP use cases. 
There is a number of essential hazards associated with each of the two use cases; measures to mitigate these hazards are 
presented. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Paving the way towards the development of the Maritime 
Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) requires innovative 
and bold initiatives. Such a collaborative initiative is the 
AUTOSHIP project [1], which aims at converting two 
conventional vessels in remotely controlled and 
autonomous vessels as well as testing and operating them; 
in particular, a Short Sea Shipping (SSS) cargo vessel and 
an Inland Waterways (IWW) barge. AUTOSHIP is a 
€27M budget project funded by EU with a duration of 42 
months, which started on 1st June 2019. The AUTOSHIP 
consortium involving 10 partners gathers the 
technological excellence as well as the market, industry 
and academic knowledge and know-how to analyse and 
define the extended framework related to MASS adoption 
and acceptance. 
 
The main aim of AUTOSHIP project is the promotion of 
autonomous shipping in Europe. The project specific 
objectives focus on the development of key enabling 
technologies, including shore/remote control centres, 
autonomous navigation, intelligent maintenance, 
operation and safety based on Artificial Intelligence 
algorithms. In addition, communication technology 
enabling a prominent level of cyber security, will be 
developed and experimentally validated targeting both 
retrofitting of existing vessels and new ships design.  
 
Moreover, another project objective is the development 
and use of new tools including simulators and decision 
support tools for operators training, cost assessment and 
optimisation of the next generation autonomous ships. It 
is expected that the developed tools and methods will 
support the operation and optimisation of conventional 
vessels as well. The project objectives also include the 
review of the environmental and socio-economic aspects 
for the autonomous shipping transportation and scaling up 
at a global level. This will allow for quantification of 
societal, environmental and financial impact stemming 
from modal-shifts from road to waterborne transport, jobs 
shifting towards higher-skills positions, and new business 
cases. 
 
The safety and security (including cyber-security) is 
another objective of paramount importance for the 
development of MASS. Two work packages led by the 
Maritime Safety Research Centre (MSRC) of the 
University of Strathclyde [2] are dedicated to activities, 
which include comprehensive regulatory, societal, 
economic, (cyber)security and safety analyses, thus 
leading to the development of a roadmap, methodologies, 
advanced methods and standards for planning and design 
of next generation MASS, duly motivated by the two full-
scale demonstrators testing. Based on the project results a 
proposal to IMO for amending and improving the existing 
regulatory framework is planned. 
 
The realisation of the last-mentioned objective of the 
AUTOSHIP project is implemented according to the 
following steps. First, the two investigated vessels supply 
chains are analysed including the operating phases and the 
involved actors. Subsequently, the existing regulatory 
framework for the two use cases is analysed. Based on the 
available information for the two use cases, a risk 
assessment is implemented and risk control measures are 
defined. These investigations support the development of 
a novel safety, security and cybersecurity framework 
focusing on autonomous ships. Based on these steps the 
major gaps for scaling-up the demonstrators are provided. 
These steps are elaborated further in the next sections and 
some of the project findings are presented. 
 
2. SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS 
 
This is a task led by SINTEF [3], aiming at the supply 
chain analysis to provide the foundation for following-up 
analyses on: (a) the impact of autonomy introduction on 
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regulations; (b) the societal and economic scenarios; (c) 
definition of the basic operational scenarios for the risk 
assessment. This analysis also provides input for 
determining the operations, functions and controls for the 
two use cases along with the vessels routes, including 
segments with remote controlled/monitored sailing and 
totally unmanned bridge. 
 
This study and analysis are based on information from 
semi-structured interviews carried out with staff from the 
AUTOSHIP project operators, specifically, Blue Line 
Logistics [4] and Eidsvaag [5]. The survey was built up to 
capture all stages of the investigated vessels supply chains 
according to the multi-stage supply chain model described 
in [6]. Emphasis was put on distribution and logistics 
chain, but also to capture relevant interactions with 
production planning and inventory control. The results of 
the semi-structured interviews were then used to map the 
supply chains by using flowchart models that describe 
both the sequence and relationships between the flow of 
goods and the flow of information. 
 
Some indicative results for the IWW use case are provided 
in the flowchart of Figure 1. As it is deduced, the supply 
chain includes several actors: customers, sales 
department, logistics department, the transporting truck 
and IWW manager. The transportation by ship is arranged 
only after a coordination between the land transport and 
ship transport. This understanding is important for the 
financial analysis. The results of the detailed supply chain 
analysis are available in the public project deliverable [1]. 
 
3. COMPLIANCE FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS 
 
The AUTOSHIP project use cases are considered to 
operate in a specific regulatory and legislative 
environment, one in the inland waterways in Belgium and 
one in national waters as well as in a route between 
Norway and Denmark. The introduction of autonomous 
ship operations requires the understanding of the gaps that 
exist in the regulatory framework. 
 
This need is addressed through task led by Bureau Veritas 
(BV) [7]. This task identifies and maps the existing 
regulatory framework including the prevailing 
regulations, rules and standards (international and 
national) for the SSS and IWW use cases considered in the 
AUTOSHIP project. 
 
A systematic review approach and direct interaction with 
the relevant partners have been employed for 
identification and analysis of all the relevant 
information/material. This has allowed for mapping the 
compliance framework of the two use cases design and 
operation against the existing rules, regulations, standards 
and codes. 
 
The analysis has been limited to mandatory instruments 
related to maritime safety and maritime security: 
 Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS), International 
Convention on Load Lines (CCL), Tonnage, 
International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW), 
Convention on the International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG), Safety And 
Rescue (SAR) operations, Maritime Labour 
Convention (MLC), European Directives, National 
and Local regulations. 
 Policy Regulations for the Navigation of Rhine 
(RPNR), European Code for Inland Waterways 
(CEVNI), Strasbourg Convention on the limitation of 
liability in inland navigation (CLNI), the Strasbourg 
Convention on the collection, deposit and reception 
of waste (CDNI), European Directives, Regional, 
National and Local regulations for the IWW use case. 
 
IMO Interim Guidelines for MASS trials, IMO Guidelines 
on maritime cyber risk management and Bureau Veritas 
Guidelines for Autonomous Shipping [8] have also been 
considered. It should be noted that it does not include all 
codes and standards relevant for such SSS & IWW use 
cases (e.g. land based regulations for remote control centre 
located at shore). 
The main identified areas where amendments or new 
developments are required are the following: 
 Definition and responsibilities of the master, crew and 
responsible person in new context. 
 Regulations requiring the presence and actions of 
human operators on-board, manual operations or 
indication/alarm on the bridge. 
 No provisions for compulsory systems, devices and 
procedures that would facilitate crewless vessel 
Figure 1 IWW Supply chain overview. 
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operation (all tasks will be not moved from crew to 
remote operators, some tasks will be performed by 
systems on board). 
 Functions, rights and responsibilities of Remote 
Control Centre, including personnel qualification. 
More detailed results of regulatory framework analysis are 
provided in the pertinent deliverable [1]. 
 
4. RISK ASSESSMENTS 
 
The introduction of autonomous ships is accompanied 
with a number of challenges related to safety, security and 
cybersecurity. The safety challenges can be attributed to 
increased complexity related to the interactions between 
the autonomous ships systems/components and 
environment [9]. Furthermore, cybersecurity has been an 
important issue, as a cyber-attack can exploit 
vulnerabilities in the communication links and directly 
affect the integrity or availability of the data and control 
systems, leading to accidents [9, 10]. A number of 
incidences with unauthorised people gaining remote 
access to the ship control systems was recently reported 
[11]. Terrorists or pirates could potentially board an 
autonomous vessel trying to take control, which might 
lead to hazardous/inadvertent situations (e.g. collision 
with another ship or requests for significant ransom). 
 
The availability of different methods for safety, security 
and cybersecurity analysis might create a confusion on 
their suitability and applicability as well as for the required 
sequence. For the purposes of this analysis, a classic 
HAZID as proposed according to the BV rules [8] with 
some modifications was selected. In addition, alternative 
approaches employed in other industries and their 
marinisation (customisation to the requirements of the 
maritime industry) are investigated. These include the 
SAE ARP4761 standard for development of civil aircrafts 
and systems as well as the ISO/PAS21488 and the 
approach of Safety of Indented Functionality (SOTIF). 
The risk assessment focuses mainly on the autonomous 
vessels and associated remote control centre functions 
during different operational phases. This task is primarily 
led by MSRC in close cooperation with BV and SINTEF. 
 
The identification process focusing on system parts as 
shown in Figure 2 is implemented following the process 
presented in Error! Reference source not found.. First a 
specific group of functions is selected for the analysis. For 
this group of functions, a specific operating phase is 
considered. For each combination of functions and 
operating phases, a specific type of inadvertent event is 
considered either primarily related to safety, security or 
cybersecurity. The inadvertent event is identified by 
focusing on the output of a specific function. For 
identifying the potential hazards, guidance statements are 
used, such as provided wrong, not provided, provided in 
timely, provided results in conflict. For 
security/cybersecurity related events, different threat 
groups are considered. For each scenario, potential causes 
are considered in terms of safety (system error, failure, 
human error, inadvertent environment conditions, missing 
input), security (management failure, missing/faulty 
technical barrier, operating in dangerous area) and 
cybersecurity (potential cyberattacks types and 
vulnerabilities). For each cause and hazard, 
incident/accident categories are defined and potential 
consequences are identified in terms of safety, damage to 
environment or financial impact.  
 
The main identified inadvertent events include the 
following: 
 The surrounding situation is not properly (wrongly or 
not) determined e.g. Objects (small objects, 
navigation marks, ships, ship lights, floating objects, 
depth) are not detected and recognised, weather is not 
properly determined. 
Figure 2 Analysis focus. 
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 Situation awareness equipment malfunction due to a 
generic cyberattack during berthing / sailing / 
manoeuvring. 
 Ship on collision track with other vessels/on 
grounding track (no output / wrong output from 
collision avoidance system). 
 Selecting route with heavy traffic/ bad weather 
conditions/ Close to shallow water/low visibility / 
close to obstacles. 
 Vessel erratic operation/movements. 
 
 
Figure 3 Risk analysis approach. 
 
The potential risk mitigation measures include: 
 Crosscheck of information coming from different 
sources using voting mechanisms. 
 Installation of firewall and intrusion detection system 
in ship control network. 
 Automatic remote-control centre personnel in case of 
serious malfunctions and take over. 
 Double verification of selected route. 
 Filters installed on sensors used for ship position 
control. 
The results of the HAZID session along with detailed 
information for the risk and control measures will be 
provided in future publications. 
 
5. NOVEL SAFETY, SECURITY, 
CYBERSECURITY ASSURANCE FRAMEWORK 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
The MASS can be described as systems of Cyber-Physical 
Systems (CPSs). The additional complexity of the marine 
CPS on autonomous ships can be attributed to the novel 
components such as the shore control centre, the novel 
communication links, the novel human-machine 
interfaces, the extensive cyber (software) supported 
functions. It is expected that the existing safety assurance 
methods may have inherent weaknesses for supporting 
identification of all the potential hazardous scenarios [9, 
12]. 
 
In this task, which is led by MSRC, a critical review of the 
methods and standards used for safety, security and 
cybersecurity assurance in different domains was 
implemented. Based on the standards and methods 
limitations, a novel safety assurance framework is 
proposed to support the design of safe, secure and cyber 
secure autonomous ships. The framework includes 
parallel but interacting processes for safety, security and 
cybersecurity of the MASS assurance. Each (safety, 
security, cybersecurity) assurance is double staged, 
proceeding from high-level analysis to lower, more 
detailed analysis and in parallel with Vee design process, 
as shown in  
Figure 4. The analysis results are also used to derive 
specific test scenarios for MASS and support the 
development of the safety, security and cybersecurity 
case, which is addressed in other project tasks. In addition, 
a number of novel and advanced safety, security and 
cybersecurity analysis methods such as STPA [13], 
Cyber-Risk Assessment for Marine Systems [14] fitting 
into the new safety assurance framework is proposed for 
overcoming the existing methods drawbacks. 
  
Figure 4 Proposed safety framework aligned with Vee 
design process. 
 
 
6. GAP ANALYSIS 
 
Using the output from previous tasks, the final purpose of 
this task led by MSRC is to identify gaps for wider 
adoption of the two demonstrators/use cases. This is 
carried out by implementing a multi-dimensional analysis. 
 
The analysis is articulated in two steps. First the functional 
and operational requirements and Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) are defined considering the whole 
supply chain. Then, impact analysis of the identified 
scenarios is implemented for the two use cases. This is still 
work in process and results are anticipated to be published 
in the future studies. 
 
 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper, the main objectives and some results of the 
AUTOSHIP project were presented. The results 
demonstrate that for the two use cases: 
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 The operation is implemented using a complex and 
highly interacting supply chain including several 
phases. 
 A number of gaps exists in the existing regulatory 
framework, which need to be addressed to allow 
wider adoption of the use cases. 
 Emerging hazards on the two use cases need to be 
addressed using appropriate control measures. 
 The complexity of the autonomous ships requires the 
development of novel integrated design, safety, 
security, cybersecurity frameworks employing 
modern and advanced methods and tools for these 
systems analysis. 
 The enhancement of operations and adoption for the 
novel use cases requires the definition of KPIs 
connected to the supply chain. 
AUTOSHIP is an ongoing project and novel outputs are 
being constantly generated, such as methods, tools, 
concepts, results to support the design and operation of the 
two use cases. It is expected that these results will also 
support the general community of autonomous ships 
designers. 
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